6-29-07, 9:40 am

[See Part 1 of this paper by clicking here.]


On May 5, 2006, in the Nigerian capital of Abuja, the government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement (Mani Arko Manawi’s faction) signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), also known as the Abuja Agreement. The agreement was signed after the international community mainly the US and the African Union, exerted great pressure on the negotiating parties. However, many observers are still wondering about the enthusiastic interest of the United States and the West regarding Darfur. In our Party’s view, this interest can be explained in the following way:

1. The Darfur region occupies a strategic position. Darfur is bounded by Chad, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, and the Central Africa Republic – all the nations of West Africa up to the Atlantic Ocean. This region has become a battleground for the transnational monopolies, who are trying to gain possession of Africa's petroleum wealth and other raw materials, assisted by organizations such as NEPAD (the New Partnership for Africa’s Development) and others.

The United States is playing a major role in the region and in the Sudanese conflict. The geographical boundaries of the entire area extending from Libya to Chad and Central Africa, are strategic elements in the goals of the Great Powers in the region and fuel their internecine struggles. Furthermore, the war in Darfur casts a dangerous shadow that threatens to spread the conflict to other parts of the continent.

2. The negative developments that followed the US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan have forced the United States to try to present a new face of peace and reconciliation – that is, to attempt to appear more humanitarian than it has in Iraq.

3. The international community is still in a state of shock and guilt due to its silence and inaction regarding the horrible crimes committed in Rwanda and Burundi. Therefore, the Darfur crisis has managed to obtain a position of priority on the agendas of the world powers, especially in the United Nations Security Council.

4. The international community, which supported the peace process in southern Sudan, fears that the continuation of fighting in Darfur could lead to the failure of the peace process in the South of the country.

5. Studies indicate the presence of rich mineral reserves in the form of petroleum, uranium, and other minerals in Darfur.

In spite of reservations and criticisms regarding the Darfur Peace Agreement, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) considered it to be a starting point for the peace process in Darfur. However, the Party stressed that the agreement could only succeed if additions were made to satisfy the demands of the factions which did not sign the original agreement, and firmly stated that in its present form the DPA does not fulfill the basic demands of the people of Darfur. Today, despite the DPA agreement, the situation in Darfur has deteriorated and the military conflict has increased, along with the number of victims and the severity and destructiveness of the fighting. The SCP has also condemned all attempts to threaten and coerce the non-signatory parties. Instead, the Party has insisted on the importance of listening to their demands again and searching for the ways and means to reach an agreement with them.

The SCP’s reservations about the Darfur Peace Agreement

Given this context, the Communist Party's reservations about the DFA agreement can be summarized as follows:

1. The negotiations in Abuja over the conflict in Darfur, and therefore what the eventual DFA agreement entailed, were governed by the provisions of the earlier Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of January 2005 that formally ended the war between the Khartoum government and the insurgent Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in the South. The CPA thus imposed its own rigid framework and guidelines on the subsequent Darfur Agreement.

It is well known that the protocols of Machakos and Naivasha (negotiated in Kenya in 2002 and 2004 respectively) extended well beyond the issue of the civil war in the South to deal with all aspects of the Sudanese crisis, including issues such as maintaining the peace, Sudanese identity, national unity, democracy, forms of government, the development and division of resources, the army, security, foreign affairs, etc. The CPA also undertook to create basic changes in the current structure of the political system, including the issue of self-determination and whether there would be a single, unified state or two states during the transitional period. All these issues were decided on by two parties only – the Islamic Front government and the SPLM, while all other political and social forces in Sudan, including the armed factions in Darfur, were not involved. Therefore, it is not logical to commit the factions in Darfur to an agreement based on the two-party Comprehensive Peace Agreement, thus confining them in a framework they did not contribute to.

The Communist Party believes that in order to solve these national problems and bring an end to armed confrontation in the country, it is necessary to achieve a comprehensive national consensus which deals with all aspects of the Sudanese crisis. This can only succeed if all the country’s political forces are actively engaged in the process, both at the level of decision-making and implementation.

2. In the Abuja negotiations, the international community adopted the same methodology it utilized at Naivasha, the methodology of taking only a piecemeal approach to the Darfur conflict. Such a partial approach pays no attention to the subsequent fragility of the solutions reached, which are, at best, only temporary solutions and under a real threat of collapsing at any time. This same approach was utilized in the Ivory Coast conflict, and in Cameroon, Sierra Leone, and Chad. It is a methodology that does not look at the Sudanese crisis as a whole, that is, as a single crisis manifested in many conflicts, but breaks the problem up into partial solutions imposed under intense pressure. We are firmly convinced that this approach has not been successful in the case of Sudan.

3. The international community and the African Union exerted great pressure in an effort to obtain the signatures of the various warring factions on the Darfur agreement. In this regard, the agreement does not differ much from what was attempted at Naivasha in 2004. This time, however, the result was the signing of the agreement by only one faction of one movement among the many warring factions. We therefore wonder, in regard to this approach, if the mediators did not notice, or noticed but did not care enough to take into consideration, the composition and structure of the armed movements in Darfur – that they were directly connected to the tribal divisions in the region. What is abundantly clear to everyone now is that the way the agreement was signed and implemented will only encourage the continuation of the bloody tribal conflict in Darfur.

The Deployment of United Nations Troops in Darfur

The position of the SCP on the deployment of the United Nations troops in Darfur [1] is based on the following factors:

1. The key point here is that the deployment of UN troops has become a general and essential demand of the people of Darfur, especially those now living in refugee camps. UN troops are needed in order to protect them against the constant attacks of the Janjaweed. The African Union troops have failed to provide such protection, and the government troops are considered as a party in the conflict with a very hostile attitude towards the people of Darfur. What is at stake is the safety of the people of Darfur and their protection from killing and physical liquidation, and on such issues there is no room for a compromise. Hence, the Party does support the deployment of UN troops.

The deployment of UN troops in Darfur should take place in the framework of a wider consultation between the UN on one side, and the government of Sudan and all Sudanese political forces on the other. These consultations should deal with all the details related to the task of deployment, including the composition of these troops.

2. The role of the United Nations should not be limited to providing protection for the people of Darfur, but should be extended to achieving a political settlement to the crisis.

The Search for Ways to Resolve the Crisis

In September 2006, the Communist Party sent an envoy to meet with the leadership of the armed factions in Darfur that did not sign the Abuja agreement. The idea was to discuss with these factions possible ways of overcoming the severe tension and acute polarization in the country, and to explore the possibility of laying the foundations for a sustainable and equitable peace that would prevent the fragmentation of Sudan.

In the meetings with the leaderships of the various movements, we put forward the following points as a basis for discussion and consultation:

1.Darfur is the victim of a real tragedy, a tragedy that has created broad international support and solidarity. Doesn’t this international support for the people of Darfur, we asked, require that the armed movements in Darfur attempt to concentrate their efforts around a united program, or at least a unified negotiating position, which serves the aspirations and demands of the people of Darfur?

2.The Abuja agreement has not stopped the war. Not only that, some members of the international community have started to warn about its collapse. Furthermore, the issue of deploying international forces in Darfur has increased the polarization between the Sudanese government and the international community, and this in turn has had a negative impact on situation in the country.

3.On the other hand, statements by some officials of the international community, especially by UN representatives in Sudan, have now paved the way for additional annexes to the Abuja agreement, which may satisfy those who rejected the agreement in the first place. However, such statements by members of the international community have met with a very wary response from some leaders of the of the Sudanese regime.

4.The Communist Party of Sudan, despite its publically expressed reservations about the Abuja agreement, is not rejecting it, although it certainly sees the possibility of improving the agreement by adding new annexes to it. The Party strongly rejects any attempt to threaten or stigmatize with charges of treason those factions that have refused to sign the agreement. On the contrary, the Party understands the importance of listening to the demands of these factions and searching for common ground with them. However, the question that remains is this: To what extent are the factions now ready to react to the positive signals from the UN regarding the possibility of adding annexes to the agreement? What are the proposals and suggestions they are offering in response?

5. At the end of the day, Sudan is not the property of the government, nor is it the property of any of the opposition forces. It belongs to all the people of Sudan. For that reason, the main task must be to exhaust every means to advance the peace process and reach a national consensus capable of stopping the bloodshed and laying the foundations for an equitable peace and democratic transformation, a consensus that responds to the demands of the people of Darfur, as well as those of all the other marginalized parts of the country.

The Response from Darfur

The response of the Darfur factions that met with our Party’s envoy can be summarized as follows:

1.Given the fact that the Darfur problem is a part of the overall crisis in Sudan, all the Darfur factions expressed their readiness to join a project of national unity which could be agreed upon by all the Sudanese parties and that was aimed at paving the way for peace, unity, democracy, and equitable development in the country.

2.They expressed their readiness to negotiate annexes with the government to be added to the Abuja agreement. Their negotiating positions include:

a) Agreement on a mechanism that disarms the Janjaweed and secures protection for the civilian population.

b) Agreement on compensation for the affected population, including compensation for loss of life, the psychological impact of the conflict, and loss of property, along with the provision of adequate shelter.

c) Darfur must be regarded as a single region (not divided into three regions as it is now) under a genuine federal structure consisting of four levels: federal, regional, state and local.

d) That the Darfurian people must have full participation in all central state institutions, both civil and military, and that that representation be reflective of actual population densities and within the parameters of positive discrimination. Some of the factions suggested the formation of a Presidential Council with a rotating chairmanship, or a vice-president from every region.

e) That 36% of the general state budget be allocated to Darfur, along with establishing a fund based on 6% of national income to be allocated for a period of 10 years for the development of Darfur.

f) That the Darfur factions be allowed to retain their forces during the transitional period and that these forces should be financed from the central budget.

The Sudanese Communist Party also held several meetings with representatives of the international community and the UN to discuss the Darfur problem and the peace process in the country. In these meetings the party confirmed that consultations between the international community and all the Sudanese political parties are vital for reaching effective solutions for the country's problems. For such consultations to be of real value they should take place as crucial developments are occurring and not after they have already occurred. For example, if early consultations had been held about the contentious issue of holding a referendum on whether there should be one Darfur or three separate states, much acrimony could have been avoided, if it had been recognized from the start that Darfur has always been a single, unified region.

It is equally true that it would have been possible to find an acceptable solution for the Abyei problem [Ed: A district commonly regarded as the bridge between the North and South of Sudan that both the Government of Sudan and the SPLM claimed] if, before the resolution put forward by the CPA’s five international boundary specialists, serious consultations had been held with all the political parties and with the people of the region, especially the local leaders.

The search for a just resolution of the Darfur crisis is obviously not limited to the Communist Party alone. There are many other efforts underway, including popular forums in Sudan like the Darfur Forum and the Darfur Lawyers Association, as well as a host of national and international NGOs, etc. All these bodies are working steadily on the Darfur issue, launching initiatives that reject the military option, organizing seminars and workshops, and helping in attempts to convene a Darfur dialogue conference that looks at the crisis from a national perspective. They are trying to unify the various Darfurian movements, launching international campaigns to address the grave human rights violations and atrocities in Darfur, and providing legal protection for human rights activists working in Darfur.

The Vision of the Communist Party For a Comprehensive Settlement of the Crisis

First: The top priority must be to confront the disastrous and tragic situation in the region by taking immediate measures under the auspices of the UN and the African Union, as agreed to in Addis Ababa. These measures include the following:

1. Deployment of UN troops in the region to assist the already deployed African troops in prohibiting all military operations, protecting the displaced people living in the refugee camps, and ensuring the safe delivery of humanitarian aid, food and medicine through safe corridors by imposing a no-fly zone. There must also be an immediate ceasefire with adequate international and regional supervision, along with effective measures to disarm the region and monitor all land transport and entrance points to prevent the smuggling of arms.

2. The introduction of effective mechanisms to disarm the Janjaweed and bring them to justice.

3.The establishment of an international judicial body to investigate the atrocities and ethnic cleansing in Darfur (which constitute acts of genocide), identify the criminals responsible, and bring them to trial.

4.To work for the safe return of the displaced population of Darfur to their homelands, and to ensure their protection and compensation for their losses.

Second: To bring the factions that did not sign the Abuja agreement to the negotiating table with the government. This should be done under the supervision of the UN and the African Union, with the purpose of adding annexes to the Abuja agreement.

Third: To organize a Darfurian Conference to give the people of Darfur the chance to address the Abuja agreement directly and allow for possible annexes to be added to the DPA. The resolutions of this conference should be annexed to the peace agreement. The conference should be held in a free and democratic environment, away from the government and with the help of the UN.

Fourth: The Communist Party believes that the correct approach to the Darfur problem is to recognize that it is not just a tribal conflict, but is rather the result of a more general crisis in Sudan, one characterized by the continuous marginalization of the country’s peripheries. Darfur is one of these peripheries. Consequently, the problem is basically a political one and requires a national political solution.

Hence, the idea of convening a national political conference on Darfur is a necessity. Such a conference should be attended by all the political forces in the country, including the Darfurian armed movements and all sectors of the Darfurian people. The conference must embrace all initiatives that attempt to resolve the conflict.

Fifth: Darfur is suffering the effects of demographic and geopolitical changes in the Sudanese state on the western borders of the country. These borders are a vast, open and unprotected boundary with three African countries:

Chad, Central Africa, and Libya. During the Libyan-Chadian conflict, the factions initiated their attacks from Darfur, and the defeated then took refuge in Darfur to reorganize before re-attacking again. Central Africa launches frequent attacks through Darfur in revenge for the intervention of the Khartoum government in the Bangui conflict. These vast, open and unprotected boundaries can only be protected by a policy of good neighborliness. Thus, Sudan should not view its borders as a bridge to be used for the ambitions of any nation or regime that wishes to spread across Africa under the name of Islam or Arab Nationalism.

The Communist Party of the Sudan believes that a lasting solution for the problems of the country can only be achieved by addressing all the above-stated problems in a comprehensive approach. The best mechanism for such an approach is the convening of a national conference attended by all the Sudanese political forces. At this conference, all previous agreements – Naivasha, Abuja, Eastern Sudan, Cairo, etc. – should be be tabled, not in order to open them up for wholesale re-discussion, but to accommodate other, previously neglected opinions, with the aim of further improving the agreements and broadening participation in their implementation and monitoring. Such a conference will pave the way for the political forces participating in it to implement a national consensus project. Such a consensus project is the key. It is the only mechanism that can save the country.

A National Consensus Project will give careful consideration to Sudan’s multi-ethnic nature and the developmental disparities that exist in different parts of the country. It will confront, by means of a democratic process in which all the Sudanese people participate, the problems of unbalanced development, and it will work to achieve a just and equitable sharing of power and wealth, so that a united and secure Sudan can be preserved for all its people.

--This is a slightly edited article submitted by the Sudanese Communist Party.

[1]- On 1/7/2006 the party issued a statement supporting the deployment of the international troops in Darfur.