Iraq Intelligence as Public Relations

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9-05-07, 9:34 am




The latest unclassified portions of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), authored by the Director of National Intelligence office and released in August, appears to have been constructed in a manner that supports the Bush administration's public relations efforts to continue the occupation of Iraq.

This a controversial claim because by all accounts the DNI, Michael McConnell is not supposed to be a partisan or policy advocate. Intelligence should be policy neutral. But McConnell allowed himself to be used in late July by the White House to pressure Democrats to pass a FISA reform bill that erodes civil liberties.

McConnell backed off of a negotiated compromise he and the Democrats had forged on the bill that would have protected judicial oversight of warrants for wiretappings and domestic surveillance by the government. He did so, obviously, at the bidding of the White House, just before a vote and demanded that Democrats pass the president's version of the bill.

McConnell is also responsible for the final version of the NIE, a compilation of the intelligence work of various agencies. So how does this NIE fit into Bush's PR campaign?

In order to continue the occupation of Iraq and to avoid troop withdrawals, Bush needs to show progress in Iraq, but not too much. The declassified sections of this NIE have it all.

Here are some clips:

'...the level of overall violence, including attacks on and casualties among civilians, remains high; Iraq's sectarian remain unreconciled; AQI [Al Qaeda in Iraq] retains the ability to conduct high profile attacks; and to date, Iraqi political leaders remain unable to lead effectively.'

Some successes appear to come from new tactics related to 'working with Iraqi forces, some tribal elements, and some Sunni insurgents....' Bush supporters claim these successes in western Iraq (Al-Anbar) result from the 'surge.' Bush critics say these development arose over the last few months by offers of cash and weapons to Sunni elements (some former insurgents) in Al-Anbar as the Washington Post reported in August.

But... 'Broadly accepted political compromises required for sustained security, long-term political progress, and economic development are unlikely to emerge unless there is a fundamental shift in the factors driving Iraqi political and security developments.'

So the problem is basically political. One might even argue that US involvement, both military and political, is primarily 'driving Iraqi political and security developments.'

But the report shifts the blame for insecurity to Iraqis themselves directly. Though at one point there is an interesting admission:

'The Iraqi Government's Shia leaders fear these groups [newly armed Sunni groups] will ultimately side with armed opponents of the government...'

So to clarify. The Bush administration has reached out to former insurgents, groups who have battled US forces, and with cash and weapons bribes have ostensibly brought them into the fold. But the Iraqi government, which the US has until now more or less propped up and supported, sees these groups as a potential threat. And these newly armed groups actually see acceptance of US bribes as a means of building up there power in order to compete with Shia sects who currently control the government.

Can you see how this arrangement might fail, even move the situation more rapidly toward a highly volatile and, with the new weapons that have been made available, deadly civil war?

The NIE accepts that these arrangements may be only temporary: 'we judge the initiatives will only translate into widespread political accommodation and enduring stability if the Iraqi Government accepts and supports them.'

Remember this is a bribe program, and has little to do with the increased troop levels, though the White House and its supporters are making that claim.

So why does the Bush administration take steps that seem contradictory and unlikely to resolve intense insecurity issues both sides feel?

1. To maintain US occupation and involvement by preserving an insecure situation 2. Newly armed Sunni groups are meant to counter Shia control and Iranian influence in the Shia groups that either control the Iraqi government or the armed groups currently involved in the sectarian conflict

This is where we get to the heart of the matter: the new tactics are not about Iraq's security, but Iran's influence. Essentially, we are seeing the first steps toward a proxy war with Iran that is going to be fought out in Iraq. But this isn't in the declassified portions of the NIE.

The NIE presents the perfect mix of bad and good to keep the political terrain in Washington at a status quo. It gives few Republicans reason to bolt from the President's 'stay-the-course' message and gives few Democrats much ammunition to demand a serious effort to block Bush's new $50 billion supplemental request made with hints of troop withdrawals at some future time. Thus, politicized intelligence reports such as the NIE or even the forthcoming Petraeus report (actually authored by the White House) cannot be the basis for a decision on how to vote on the war.

Thus the NIE is a heavily politicized document that undermines the concept of policy neutral intelligence. Further, Bush's stay-the-course policy is getting more people killed, a fact hidden by rosy predictions and misleading claims of success.

The Democrats would do well to come out fighting in these final months of the session. They have to demand a real alternative to prolonged occupation, lazy intelligence, rosy denials of reality, and the White House's deadly inertia.

--Reach Joel Wendland at

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